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Abstract
We argue that a network of shipping companies, that cooperatively executes transportation tasks, can
be viewed as a special instance of a virtual enterprise. We propose the matrix auction as an efficient,
incentive compatible allocation mechanism for virtual transportation enterprises. The implementation
of the matrix auction in a multi-agent fleet scheduling system is described, and we were able to
observe a significant improvement of the task allocation.
1 Introduction
In this paper the problem of efficiently allocating transportation tasks in a network of
cooperating shipping companies that are independent and self-interested is adressed from an
economic point of view.
In the highly competitive haulage business, small and medium sized shipping companies that
operate locally are often forced to form temporary inter-regional alliances in order to bundle
their resources and to establish competitive prices.
The business process of a transportation task is often split into subtasks: the local pick-up and
delivery of the cargo and the transport over the longer distance between the source and
destination regions. This split process is often performed by a team of two or three different
hauliers that are specialised either on local or long-distance delivery. This regional
specialisation, as well as specialisation on certain types of cargo like frozen or dangerous
goods, are the core competencies of the hauliers involved.
This constellation matches Arnold’s [Arnold et al. 95] definition of a virtual enterprise (VE)
as a temporary cooperation network of legally independent companies which quickly unite
and mainly contribute their core competencies in order to exploit a specific market
opportunity — i.e., to provide a demanded service or product — on the basis of a common
understanding of business. Though the virtual enterprise refuses an institutionalization — it
has no central office, no hierarchy and no vertical integration — the autonomous partner
companies act to externals as a single corporation.
Partners in such a virtual transportation enterprise, as well as in any other kind of virtual
enterprise, are self-interested, i.e. they rate their own profit higher as the common profit of the
group. Hence, a group of agents that try to optimise their own, local utility risks to end up
with a suboptimal global solution which might even prevent the coming about of the whole
cooperation.
An approach to overcome this dilemma is the usage of truth revealing [Ma et al. 88]
allocation mechanisms, i.e. mechanism that are designed such that the best strategy for the
participants is to reveal their true preferences to the coordinator, i.e. a trusted agent that
coordinates the allocation process.
The most common truth revealing mechanism is the Vickrey auction [Vickrey 61], which can
be used for resource allocation and task assignment. Its pricing rule — called the Vickrey
principle — determines that the task or item auctioned off is awarded to the bidder who stated
the best bid at the price of the second-best bid. This principle enforces that neither bidding
higher nor bidding lower then the true valuation or cost is beneficial.
In the resource allocation variant of the Vickrey auction, the bidders submit one sealed bid for
a single item which reflects their valuations for the item. The item is granted to the highest bid
for the price of the second highest bid. In the task assignment variant, the bidders compete for
an order (resp. announced task). They submit one sealed bid for the order which reflects their
cost for performing the order. The order is awarded to the lowest bidder and the payment he
receives for performing the order equals the second-lowest bid made.
In this paper we investigate the matrix auction, an incentive compatible mechanism for
assigning multiple tasks to a group of agents. We implemented and evaluated the matrix
auction on the basis of an existing fleet scheduling system. We believe that the matrix-auction
is an efficient coordination tool for the management of business processes, and especially of
supply chains in virtual enterprises.
In the following sections we explain the allocation mechanism behind the matrix auction, and
analyse the complexity of the allocation function. Subsequently, we will shortly describe the
— to our knowledge — first real implementation of a matrix auction (see Section 3) and then
conclude by sketching some results of empirical evaluations of the performance of the matrix
auction in the transportation domain
2 The Matrix Auction
The matrix auction (MA) is applicable for the simultaneous assignment of multiple items or
tasks to organisational entities. The matrix auction was roughly sketched in [Gomber et al. 96]
at first. Unfortunately, this presentation left the reader with some open questions concerning
the matrix auction's complexity, implementation, and allocative efficiency. In the following
paragraphs, we will answer these questions.
2.1 Truth Revealing Allocation Mechanisms
The Revelation Principle [Ma et al. 88] is a fundamental theorem in the economic theory of
mechanism design. It states that for any allocation function, that can be implemented in
dominant strategies, there exists an equivalent direct mechanism that implements that
function truthfully in dominant strategies. In other words: if there exists a mechanism resp. a
multi-player game that a planner can use to realise an allocation function, i.e. to allocate
resources to a set of players such that his desired allocation results if the players play their
equilibrium strategies, then there does also exist a direct truth revealing mechanism where the
equilibrium strategy for all players is to reveal their true preferences to the planner by simply
sending the planner a message.
For instance, the Vickrey auction is a direct truth revealing mechanism that implements the
same allocation function as the English auction.
A mechanism is said to be incentive compatible if none of the participants has an incentive to
differ from the expected strategy, i.e. if the strategies are in the Nash equilibrium.
2.2 The Matrix Auction Procedure
The agents obtain the information about the outstanding tasks over broadcasting or over a
blackboard. Then they calculate their costs for performing these tasks and report them to a
trusted coordinator agent who performs the auction. If the set of tasks contains k tasks, the
agents are asked to calculate the cost of 2n-1 potential task combinations.
From the transmitted bids of the agents the auctioneer sets up a matrix the cells of which
represent the cost statements of the agents for each combination of tasks. Going out from this
he identifies the optimal allocation which causes the minimal cost. For this variation of the
assignment problem [Ohlsen & Porter 94] he uses an algorithm that takes into account that the
maximum of assignments in each row equals one. Beyond this, assigned task combinations
must not have any item or task in common, i.e. they must be disjunctive (form a partition of
the item set).
After the auctioneer has identified the optimal allocation, he determines the payments the
agents receive for the assigned task combinations according to the Vickrey principle (see
below). Eventually, the auctioneer informs the selected agents about which tasks are assigned
to them and which payments they receive for performing them. The bids of the other agents
are rejected.
2.3 Settlement of Payments According to the Vickrey Principle
The payment for each assigned task subset equals the second-lowest bid in the matrix column
for that task set. This Vickrey principle [Vickrey 61] makes the matrix auction incentive-
compatible, i.e. it assures that the agents reveal their true cost valuations for tasks. This is due
to the fact that the bid of an agent — revealing his cost valuation for an item — does
determine whether he is selected for performing the task but does not influence the payment
he receives for his service. Vickrey points out that his mechanism improves “...the chances of
obtaining or approaching the optimum allocation of resources ...”.
Task Combinations
Agent {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3}
A 80 60 50 90 110 100 150
B 30 90 20 120 50 100 160
C 80 40 40 110 80 90 180
Table 1: An example for the settlement of payments in the matrix auction
Table 1 illustrates an example of this mechanism where three different items are allocated to
three agents. According to the Vickrey principle agent C gets 60 currency units for
performing task 2 and agent B gets 80 currency units as payment for performing the tasks 1
and 3 together.
2.4 Complexity of the Allocation Function
The assignment of tasks or orders according to the matrix auction concept is not a trivial
problem. Moreover, at the moment it seems as if there does not exist an efficient algorithm for
determining the optimal assignment in larger matrices that are not symmetric.
The problem of matching n individuals to n different slots is known as the assignment
problem [Olson & Porter 94]. The total number of possible ways of assigning n individuals to
n slots or items equals n⋅(n-1)⋅(n-2)⋅...⋅2⋅1=n!. As n grows, n! grows very rapidly. Hence, the
number of possible assignments grows fast with increasing n. Therefore, the problems in this
category can only be handled by efficient algorithms which are guaranteed to obtain a
solution within a reasonable amount of time. Integer programs and combinatorical
optimisation problems typically belong in this category. For high n these problems become
intractable.
The Hungarian method [Kuhn 55, Murty 95] is known to be an efficient method for
determining optimal assignments in n×n matrix auctions. In all applications of the assignment
problem, only an integral solution matrix (i.e., a matrix whose cells cij contain an 1 if bidder i
is awarded to item j and 0 if he is not) makes practical sense. However, since in the matrix
auction we have to assign k items to n bidders, this method cannot be applied any more.
In the matrix auction, for determining the optimal assignment of a task set consisting of k
tasks to n agents, initially, all n bidding agents have to calculate their cost for all the elements
(called slots) of the task set’s power set. This vectors of cost are sent to the coordinator who
has to determine — on the basis of the resulting n×(2k-1) cost matrix — the assignment that
minimises the sum of the cost of the tasks.
The matrix auction assignment problem can be formalised as follows:
A further problem for determining the optimal assignment is caused by the constraint that the
assigned slots have to be disjunctive and to represent a partition of the task set. This is due to
the fact that a task cannot be assigned simultaneously to two distinct agents. The resulting
assignment problem is a set covering problem with colouring constraints which is NP-
complete. For a detailed description of the matrix auction and several other auction based
allocation procedures we refer to [Fischer et al. 98].
3 A Pragmatic Solution Approach in MAS-MARS
What remains to prove is that the proposed — theoretically promising, since incentive-
compatible — matrix auction does yield efficient outcomes in practice.
We decided to evaluate the matrix auction mechanism in the field of cooperative
transportation scheduling: Several transportation companies form a virtual transportation
enterprise, that — disposing of the core competencies of the participating hauliers — is more
competitive than each of the single companies.
For this purpose, several types of the matrix auction mechanism differing in the number of
simultaneously assigned items, have been implemented and integrated into the MAS-MARS
[Fischer et al. 96] multi-agent system for distributed transportation scheduling which has been
developed at the German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence.
3.1 Multi-Agent Modelling of the Transportation Domain
Over the past few years, the scheduling of transportation orders has been established as an
important field of application for Distributed Artificial Intelligence both from an academic
and from a practical perspective [Sandholm 93, Fischer et al. 96, Bürckert et al. 98]. It offers
interesting complexity properties, an inherent distribution of knowledge and control, natural
possibilities to study coordination and cooperation, and finally, there is a considerable
economic interest in obtaining good solutions for these kinds of problems.
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We consider a scenario where independent shipping companies form a cooperative network in
order to increase their competitiveness. This network of shipping companies can be regarded
as a  virtual enterprise. In accord with the definition cited in the introduction [Arnold et al. 95]
this network unites the core competencies of the involved hauliers to model the business
processes of executing transportation tasks.
Figure 1: The holonic structures of the transportation domain.
Figure 1 illustrates an approach to map the structures of such a virtual transportation
enterprise to a multi-agent society: The participating companies that form the VE are
modelled by agents that represent the company’s vehicles and by a company agent that
coordinates the vehicles and represents the company to the rest of the agent society. The VE
coordinator represents the VE to the user and manages the interaction between the
participating companies. The use of holonic agents, i.e. agents that are composed of sub-
agents and that act as if they were a single agent, allows to model the relevant structures of the
domain in a natural way: the trucks, the companies, and the virtual enterprise are modelled as
autonomous agents. Realistic tour planning may even enforce further decomposition of the
vehicles into physical components like driver, truck, and trailer. However, this is not in the
scope of this paper. For a detailed overview on holonic fleet management we refer to
[Bürckert et al. 98].
3.2 The MAS-MARS System
The MAS-MARS multi-agent system simulates a scenario of cooperating transportation
companies. The companies have to carry out transportation orders which arrive
asynchronously and dynamically. The purpose of the MAS-MARS system is the planning and
scheduling of these transportation orders which is usually done by the human dispatchers of
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the companies. Many of the problems which must be solved in this area, such as the
Travelling Salesman and related scheduling problems, are known to be NP-hard. Moreover,
not only since just-in-time production has come up, planning must be performed under a high
degree of uncertainty and incompleteness, and it is highly dynamic. In reality, these problems
are far from being solved.
Corresponding to the physical entities in the domain, there are two basic types of agents in
MAS-MARS: transportation companies and trucks. Each truck agent is associated with a
particular shipping company from which it receives orders. Company agents can
communicate with their truck agents and among each other. Furthermore, a coordinator agent
announces transportation orders to the shipping company agents. The coordinator agent acts
internally as a broker but represents the virtual transportation enterprise to the outside. The
shipping company agents compete with each other for getting awarded the orders.
Looking upon trucks as agents allows us to delegate problem-solving skills to them (such as
route-planning and local plan optimisation). The company agents themselves do not have
facilities for planning orders. Only the truck agents maintain local plans. The actual solution
to the global order scheduling problem emerges from the local decision-making of the truck
agents. The company agent has to allocate orders to its trucks, while trying to satisfy the
constraints provided by the user as well as local optimality criteria (costs). A company may
also decide to cooperate with another instead of having an order executed by its own trucks.
In the MAS-MARS system, the orders are allocated to the companies by the broker, and to the
trucks by their companies. One can choose among several allocation procedures. The
announcement and awarding of orders can be performed by the contract net protocol
[Smith 80, Sandholm 93], the Vickrey auction, or the matrix auction.
3.3 The Implemented Solution Approach
In spite of the problem complexity of the matrix auction allocation function characterised in
Section 2.4, it is not sufficient to find an approximating heuristic solution. If there is some
probability that the optimal solution will not be found, truth-telling might no longer be the
dominant strategy in the matrix auction.
In the MAS-MARS system we solve the allocation problem for task or order sets of small size
by
1. calculating all possible partitions p of the task set,
2. determining an optimal assignment for each of the p possible partitions of the task set
instead of determining an optimal assignment for the huge cost matrix of the original
problem formulation in Section 2.4,
3. selecting the one that causes the minimum cost.
3.3.1 Calculating the Number of Possible Partitions of a Set
For doing this calculation, we have to use some close relatives of the binomial coefficients,
the Stirling numbers [Stirling 30], named after James Stirling (1692-1770). Analogous to the
binomial coefficients in Pascal’s triangle, they also form patterns of coefficients. Stirling’s
triangle for subsets can be found in [Graham et al. 89].
The Stirling symbol stands for the number of ways to partition a set of n elements into k
nonempty subsets. Therefore, for partitioning a set of 5 elements we have 52 possibilities:
possibilities. For a task set consisting of n elements, the number of possible partitions grows
more than exponentially as shown in Table 2.
N Number of possible partitions Mightiness of the power set
9 21147 511
8 4140 255
7 877 127
6 203 63
5 52 31
4 15 15
3 5 7
2 2 3
1 1 1
Table 2: Number of possible partitions and mightiness of the power set of a set of n elements.
4 Evaluation
The MAS-MARS system offers outstanding opportunities for testing the efficiency of
auction-based coordination mechanisms. For our evaluation, we used the test data that
[Solomon 87] generated for the Vehicle Routing Problem with Time Windows. In this setting,
a certain amount of goods has to be transported from a central depot to a number of
customers, surrounding the depot. For each customer there are time constraints specified that
restrict the delivery time of the cargo. Solomon’s Benchmarks are available in the MAS-
MARS system. They have different characteristics concerning geometry (whether the
destinations are distributed in clusters or not), number of clients per tour, and more or less
restrictive time constraints. For each order set, there are between 8 and 12 single problems
that differ only by the time windows. The geographical position and the quantity of the cargo
remain the same.
In our evaluations, we focussed on the following points:
• We compared the quality of the solutions produced by the contract net, the Vickrey
auction, and different types of the matrix auction. The quality can be measured in terms of
distance, execution time, or number of vehicles used.
• We analysed the changes in the qualities of the global solution that are implied by
strategic bidding behaviour of agents, i.e. agents that do not reveal their true preferences
but try to maximise their profit by overbidding.
• Additionally, we examined the scalability of the matrix auction for large order sets and
high numbers of trucks.
The detailed results of the evaluations are documented in [Ruß 97] and [Gerber et al. 98];
below we summarise the results.
Performance Comparison
The matrix auction is an efficient allocation mechanism, that significantly outperforms single-
item allocation procedures like the contract net or the Vickrey auction, even if only a MA-3 or
MA-4 auction is carried through (see Table 3). This is due to the fact that the matrix auction
mechanism assigns several tasks simultaneously. Thus, in contrast to traditional sequential
auction mechanisms it can take into account cost-lowering interdependencies between single
transportation tasks while allocating them.
Procedure Solution Costs Improvement
Contract Net 205.494 0%
MA3 185.451 9.7%
MA4 175.105 14.78%
MA5 176.138 14.28%
Table 3: Synopsis of the test results
Table 3 gives an overall overview of our test results that. It is based on test runs with
clustered, semi-clustered, and non-clustered order sets. It starts with the initial CNP solution
as a basis for comparing the efficiency of the different allocation procedures. Then, the
overall solution cost of the matrix auction procedures as well as the improvements they have
yielded compared with the CNP solution are listed. The matrix auction has been implemented
with the option to choose among four task cluster sizes. That is, we are free to auction three
(MA-3), four (MA-4) or five (MA-5) orders simultaneously.
Though the MA-5 auction was supposed to yield the best outcome among the matrix auctions,
it is slightly outperformed by the MA-4 auction on the average. This could be due to the fact
that the 5-clustering unluckily separates coherent orders in the partition of the order set so that
they are assigned to two different trucks even though the orders could be cost-efficiently
performed by one truck agent.
Analysis of Strategic Bidding Behaviour
The matrix auction mechanism is theoretically incentive compatible. Due to the Vickrey
principle no single bidder has an incentive to submit bids that exceed his true costs, because
the price he is paid depends solely on the bids of the others. This situation changes when
either strategic coalitions are formed or a significantly high number of bidders does differ
from the equilibrium strategy.
It is not possible for a coalition to get round an auction based on the Vickrey principle as long
as there is one interested bidder who submits realistic bids. Such a coalition has to include all
bidders and there is a high motivation for the participants to leave it. Hence, it is difficult to
form a coalition and it is even harder to maintain it.
Nevertheless, in a setting where the bidders’ preferences for tasks are highly dependent on the
actual situation as in the tour scheduling context, the equilibrium strategy may not remain
optimal if a significant number of bidders submit bids exceeding their costs.
Strategy / Profit
Order Set Total Cost Total Profit
1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3
R101 23.311 16.442 5.106 6.256 3.628 1.452
RC201 15.688 14.086 2.589 8.348 2.527 622
C101 10.068 13.385 1.773 2.085 5.931 3.596
C201 8.931 18.023 4.438 5.881 6.736 968
Table 4: Division of total surplus among strategic bidding groups of truck agents
We have partitioned the agents society in four strategic bidder sets of equal size.
Table 4 illustrates that it pays off to follow no extreme bidding strategy if the strategies are
approximately equally distributed among the agent society. Though the subset of the truck
agents that bid their truthful valuations (bidding factor 1.0) gets the most tasks awarded, it
realises a smaller payoff than the 10 % or 20 % overbidding agent groups. The highest surplus
for each order set is emphasised in bold print (see Table 4). We conjecture that this is due to
the fact that in the beginning of the matrix auction the truthful agents mutually force down
their payments. Because all start at the same location,  initially  they make almost equal bids
for outstanding orders (as long as they stay close together). That means, that the second-
lowest price they receive as payment can be assumed to only slightly exceed their cost.
Hence, in the early stages of the allocation only the truthful truck agents are awarded orders.
In the later stages, when several orders are allocated and the valuations of the trucks vary
significantly, the lying agents often do not have to compete with truthful agents and,
therefore, are able to realise high profits.
Scalability of the Matrix Auction
The major constraining factor for the matrix auction procedure is the computational
complexity of the allocation function, which is exponential in the number of bidders and the
number of possible partitions of the task set. Because of this, MA-4 and MA-5 cannot be
scaled up to large sets of orders resp. bidders. Table 5 lists the average CPU time a 233 MHz
Pentium II PC needed for allocating 120 tasks to 18 trucks on the average.
Mechanism Vickrey MA-2 MA-3 MA-4 MA-5
Run Time 3.4s 9.0s 42.0s 338.8s 8691.4s
Table 5: Run Time Results
Since the MA-3 auction is eligible for improving the contract net solution significantly (see
Table 3) while possessing only a moderate complexity, even in complex transportation
domains it can be used to realise cost-efficient task allocations in real-time.
5 Conclusion and Outlook
In this paper we discussed the matrix auction as an efficient allocation mechanism in the
transportation domain. In comparison with the contract net allocation procedure, the matrix
auction improved the task allocation significantly.
To make use of the general principle underlying the matrix auction, the Vickrey pricing
principle, some requirements have to be fulfilled. A minimal number of bidders are needed to
prevent the formation of coalitions. Since the auctioneer receives the true valuations of the
bidders, he must be reliable, i.e. he must be neutral.
The outcome of this paper is that the matrix auction is well suited for task allocation within a
virtual transportation enterprise.
The matrix auction procedure is generally suitable for improving allocation processes in all e-
commerce scenarios in which a parallel or simultaneous matchmaking is needed or at least
reasonable. Besides other applications, it can be used to implement market-based e-commerce
systems that are open, i.e. built-up by a dynamically changing group of heterogeneous and
anonymous business entities or agents. In such systems, the matrix auction mechanism has to
be extended by an authentification mechanism for the participants (e.g. a certificate like
X.509).
Our future work will focus on applying the matrix auction procedure for the planning and
scheduling of interorganisational business processes within the more general domain of
virtual enterprises. Additionally, we will investigate if the performance of mediator
information systems can be improved by using the matrix auction for matching information
queries with resource agents that gather the desired informations by accessing heterogeneous
databases on the Internet .
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